



# Qubes OS: Security Through Isolation

1stLT Lukáš Czerner

Traditional desktop operating systems run everything together – if one app gets compromised, the whole system is at risk. There's no physical separation like we have in real life, where we naturally keep banking documents separate from gaming PCs.

Enter Qubes OS: a free, open-source security-oriented operating system that **compartmentalizes** your digital life using virtualization. It implements the core idea of isolating tasks in separate environments – "Don't put all your eggs in one basket," or rather, one VM.

**Edward Snowden** calls it *"the best OS available today"* for security – a powerful endorsement that highlights why this matters for anyone concerned about digital privacy and protection.

# About me

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## Software Engineer

Over 25 years of experience in programming. Senior Software Engineer with sizeable contributions to open-source, the Linux kernel and core user-space tools.



## Linux Kernel


Worked as a maintainer of ext4 filesystem, jbd2 layer and corresponding user-space tools at Red Hat. Contributor to filesystem, storage and memory management subsystems. Over a decade of system architecture experience.



## MoD

Leading teams focused on cognitive security, infrastructure development, and operational support, while overseeing cybersecurity initiatives within a mission-driven organization.

# Qubes OS Architecture Overview



At the core sits the Xen hypervisor, a small layer of code running directly on hardware that allows multiple VMs to run concurrently. Dom0 is the privileged domain controlling all other qubes, while AppVMs run user applications in isolation. Service qubes handle specific functions like networking (sys-net), firewall (sys-firewall), and USB devices (sys-usb).

# Deep Dive: Isolation Mechanisms



## Xen based isolation

Virtual CPU, memory, disk and network interfaces. Hardware-enforced isolation accelerated via CPU extensions like EPT for VT-x and RVI for AMD-V, preventing one VM from accessing another's memory.



## Device Isolation

Uses virtualization tech like VT-d or AMD-Vi for memory access protection, preventing compromised hardware from accessing other VMs



## GUI Isolation

Windows from each qube display with colored borders, preventing spoofing between VMs




## Clipboard Isolation

Two-step copy-paste process prevents silent data theft between VMs

Each qube has its own virtual hardware that Xen ensures remains isolated. Even the clipboard requires deliberate user action: when you hit Ctrl+Shift+C, you copy into a special buffer in Dom0, then switch VM and Ctrl+Shift+V to paste – preventing malware from silently stealing clipboard data.

# Inter-Qube Communication: qrexec



Complete isolation is secure but impractical – qubes often need to communicate in limited ways. The qrexec framework provides secure RPC between qubes, always mediated by Dom0. When you click "Open in Disposable VM" on a PDF, it triggers a qrexec call through Dom0, which starts the disposable VM and tells it to launch a PDF viewer with that file.

# Virtual Networking Architecture

Qubes OS implements a multi-layered virtual networking model that ensures true isolation while maintaining connectivity.



## AppVM

Contains applications with a virtual NIC. No knowledge or access to physical interfaces.



## sys-firewall (FirewallVM)

Filters traffic based on user-defined rules. Controls which qubes can access the network.



## sys-net (NetVM)

Owens physical network interfaces. Marked untrusted due to exposure to external networks.




## Internet

External networks remain separated from sensitive qubes by multiple isolation layers.

By default, qubes cannot communicate with each other through the network. Additional privacy options include Whonix integration for Tor routing.

# Storage Architecture & LVM Thin Provisioning



Each qube has its own private storage using LVM thin provisioning, which allocates disk space only as needed. Instead of each AppVM having a full OS copy, they share a base template. Your AppVMs use the same OS image, with VM-specific changes stored in a Copy-on-Write layer on a separate volume.

When you boot an AppVM, Qubes combines the template's read-only root image with the VM's COW overlay. Updates happen in the TemplateVM, and all AppVMs using it get those updates on next boot. Any changes to system files go to a volatile overlay that vanishes at shutdown. Only user data in /home and /rw persists.

# Real-World Use Cases & Scenarios



## Developers

Separate coding environment from untrusted research. Test in disposable VMs. Contain vulnerabilities by isolating components.



## Security Professionals

Analyze malware safely in disposable VMs. Create virtual lab environments. Use vault qubes for credentials and Split GPG for key protection.



## Journalists

Protect sources with dedicated communication qubes. Use Tor/Whonix for anonymous submissions. Maintain offline reading qubes for sensitive documents.




## Everyday Users

Separate important files from daily browsing. Compartmentalize projects and contexts with different qubes for work and personal use.

*"Qubes lets me run WannaCry ransomware for analysis and not actually cry, which is a win in my book."* For high-risk users, this compartmentalization can be life-saving, providing an air-gap alternative that's more convenient but still very secure.





# Challenges and Learning Curve



## Mental Adjustment

Users must learn to think in terms of qubes: "Which qube did I save that file in?" This requires habit changes and a new approach to computing.



## Hardware Requirements

Qubes needs fairly beefy hardware with virtualization support, plenty of RAM, and fast SSD. Hardware compatibility can be picky with GPU and Wi-Fi drivers.



## Performance Overhead

There is performance overhead compared to a single-OS environment. Video editing or gaming in Qubes is not ideal due to limited 3D acceleration support.



## Security, with Caveats

Software is buggy, and QubesOS is no exception. Dom0 is your mission control. Once it's breached, the rest of the system becomes occupied territory.



## User Responsibility

You can still leak data through poor operational security. Qubes provides tools, but you must use them wisely – "A chain is only as strong as its weakest link."

# Conclusion & Next Steps

## Understand the Architecture

Qubes OS uses Xen virtualization to achieve strong isolation between tasks. Template based AppVMs run the applications, Service Qubes provide networking, USB devices and more, while Dom0 provides GUI, inter-qube communication and manages it all. "Security through Isolation" is the mantra.

## Evaluate Your Needs

Consider if your security requirements justify the learning curve. For developers, researchers, journalists, and privacy-conscious users, Qubes provides peace of mind and flexibility that's hard to get otherwise.

## Try It Out

<https://www.qubes-os.org/>

If your hardware allows, experiment with Qubes OS. The experience can improve your overall security mindset as you start thinking in compartments.

Qubes is a shining example of practical security – it's not just theory; people use it daily. With smart design, security and usability can coexist. As an open-source, community-driven project, contributions are welcome.

# Thank You!

Questions?

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